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Foreign manufacturers have the option of using sales networks of domestic rival 
firms to save local distribution costs. Such alliances may lead to collusion or 
create greater distortions because of the additional margins imposed by foreign 
firms, as shown in the theoretical literature. This paper empirically examines 
whether these outcomes are realized by alliances using Japanese antibiotics 
market data, where cross-border alliances are common. Empirical results show 
that the marginal costs of products supplied through cross-border alliances are 
lower than those supplied by foreign firms, suggesting that alliances are effective 
devices to reduce local distribution costs for foreign firms. Furthermore, my test 
results reveal little evidence of collusion or high markups caused by cross-border 
alliances.  
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Industry. 1 Introduction
There are eectively no tari barriers for pharmaceutical products in Japan because of agreements re-
lated to the WTO. However, dierences in laws, regulations, and distribution systems in health care
and pharmaceutical markets may entail costs for foreign ﬁrms. In particular, the Japanese Pharma-
ceutical Aairs Act and local pharmaceutical distributions were considered to impose complex and
costly processes on foreign companies. Thus, it is possible that foreign ﬁrms may form alliances with
Japanese ﬁrms to alleviate such burdens to supply the Japanese market. In fact, drugs supplied through
cross-border alliances are common in Japanese drug markets.
In addition to cost-saving motives, when ﬁrms compete in a product market, cross-border alliances
can be used as collusive devices because ﬁrms are able to share proﬁts through alliances. Thus, cross-
border alliances can be considered anticompetitive; for example, distribution alliances in a highly con-
centratedmarket(e.g., MillerandMolsononCanadaandtheUSbeermarketsin1995)andcode-sharing
arrangements between airlines. Without collusion, because foreign ﬁrms may impose per-unit royalties
on alliance products, higher margins are created because of double marginalizations, which then leads
to market distortions (Tirole, 1988). While the possibilities of these anticompetitive eects of alliances
have been studied theoretically (for international alliances, see Chen (2003), and for domestic alliances,
see Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002)), whether the eects of cross-border
alliances on product market competition exist is an empirical issue.
This study ﬁrst addresses the issue of whether the supply costs of products through cross-border al-
liances are lower than those of foreign supply products. By using estimates of the demand for antibiotic
drugs in Japan, I derive implied marginal costs, and compare the costs of alliance products with those
of a foreign ﬁrm’s own products. Then, I examine the eects of per-unit royalties on market distortions.
Finally, I investigate whether the market is competitive or colluded. I empirically test whether collusion
2schemes are more consistent with the data than competition schemes by using a similar method to that
of Bresnahan (1987), Villas-Boas (2007), and Bonnet and Dubois (2008). My focus is close to that
of Goldberg and Verboven (2001), in which study the comparison between collusion and competition
was exercised by using pricing equations. This study contributes to the literature by revealing the sup-
ply condition dierences between domestic and foreign ﬁrms in a market without trade barriers, and
assessing whether market competition prevails when alliances are prominent. I use the discrete choice
framework for demand estimation of Berry (1994), and consider pricing behavior in a product market.
By using demand parameters, I derive the implied markups and marginal costs to evaluate the eects of
alliances on market competition. While this type of framework is used to examine the impacts of trade
policies in the trade literature (Goldberg (1995), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999), Ohashi (2002),
and Irwin and Pavcnik (2004)), to my knowledge there is no study of cross-border alliances. The de-
terminants of cross-border alliances have been examined empirically (Fosfuri (2004)). However, such
empirical studies have not explicitly taken market competition into account. Because theoretical stud-
ies focus on the relationship between alliance and market competition (for example, Katz and Shapiro
(1985), Qiu (2006), and Ishikawa, Morita, and Mukunoki (2008)), this paper ﬁlls the gap between
theoretical and empirical studies.
My estimation results show that the marginal costs of products supplied through cross-border al-
liances are lower than those of a foreign ﬁrm’s own products. This suggests advantages in distribution
for local manufacturers: if local ﬁrms have low distribution costs, originator ﬁrms supply through al-
liances, raise total proﬁts, and then extract proﬁt by imposing licensing fees. It may be costly for foreign
ﬁrms to create eective local distribution networks so that their own supply costs are high, and those
of local ﬁrms through alliances are low. Thus, this study contributes to the literature by revealing the
empirical determinant of cross-border alliances: the cost saving motive.
3During my sample period, the marginal cost dierences between domestic supply products, foreign
supply products, and alliance products were likely to decrease, and in particular foreign supply costs
decreased. This corresponds to the period when the Pharmaceutical Aair Act was revised, foreign
subsidiaries were reorganized, and foreign ﬁrms’ distribution strategies changed. The main aim of
the Pharmaceutical Aair Act revision was to deregulate the approval system for drug sales. Before
the revision, all ﬁrms selling drugs presumably had manufacturing plants, so the government imposed
manufacturing approval for sales. This revision meant that ﬁrms selling drugs had to be authorized
by the government. Because the approval system was similar to those in the EU and the US, foreign
manufacturing ﬁrms’ disadvantages may have been reduced.
Reorganizations of foreign subsidiaries, such as mergers, may also create eective local distribution
channels in Japan. It has been argued that supplying drugs eectively in the Japanese market requires
sucient numbers of medical representatives (MRs). An MR is a sales person who promotes drugs to
doctors. PromotiontodoctorsbyMRsisconsideredanessentialsaleschannelinJapan. Byreorganizing
subsidiaries, foreign ﬁrms can employ sucient MRs. For example, Abbott’s new subsidiary was
created by merging Dinabott, with 400 MRs, and Hokuriku Seiyaku, with 300 MRs, which amounts to
approximately 30 percent of the third-largest Japanese pharmaceutical company, Astellas. Thus, scale
merits in distribution activities may generate cost reductions. In fact, in the later years in my sample,
several alliance contracts were terminated and foreign originator ﬁrms began to supply independently.
By using demand estimates, I examine the relationship between royalty rates and pricing behavior.
The royalty rates are not observed in the data, therefore I conduct hypothetical examinations by setting
several royalty rates and deriving equilibrium behavior. My numerical examinations suggest that with
royalty payments, high royalty rates are consistent with high markups. Thus, if high royalty rates
are imposed, the anticompetitive eect of alliances may be severe. In addition, collusion behavior is
4consistent with proﬁt maximizing behavior, because implied marginal costs turn out not to be negative.
As theoretical studies such as that of Chen (2003) demonstrate, the possibility of collusion caused by
cross-border alliances may have adverse eects on market competition.
However, by examining the ﬁt of functions of marginal costs, empirical tests show that collusion
schemes are rejected in the case of Bertrand competition with only ﬁxed-fee alliances. High per-unit
royalty rate schemes are rejected by collusion schemes. The scheme that is never rejected is an alliance
with ﬁxed fees. This suggests that royalty rates may be zero and ﬁxed fees are used, and alliances are
not used as a collusive device. Hence, the anticompetitive eects of alliances on competition caused
by collusion or high markups are not found. While, as theory suggests, the pricing behavior can be
manipulated by royalties (Shapiro (1985)) and alliances can be used to mitigate intensive market com-
petition (Gallini (1984), Rockett (1990), Eswaran (1994), and Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002)), market
competition prevails in this market. This paper provides empirical ﬁndings on the eect of cross-border
alliances and insight into the evaluation of competition in a market when alliances are active.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data set. In Section 3, I set up the model
and in Section 4, estimation results are reported. In Section 5, several alliance and collusion schemes
are examined, and the ﬁnal section concludes the paper.
2 Data and Background
In this section, I introduce my sample data. I speciﬁcally consider the antibiotic drug market. This cat-
egory includes injectable and oral antibiotics: the antibiotics beta-lactam, cephalosporin, glycopeptide,
macrolide, and the quinolone antibacterial drugs. The data on approximately 30 drugs for the period
1999–2006 yield an unbalanced panel sample of 241 antibiotics. There are 17 ﬁrms in my sample, of
which seven are foreign. For example, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), and Abbott sell drugs on their own
5and also form alliances with Japanese companies. On the other hand, Bristol–Myers Squibb (BMS) and
Pﬁzer only sell drugs independently. In my sample, because ﬁve of seven alliance products are supplied
through cross-border alliances, the eects of cross-border alliances will be prominent. One product,
“Banan,” was introduced by both the originator, Daiichi Sankyo, and GSK. It is supplied by a foreign
ﬁrm, but the originator is a Japanese company.
By focusing on pharmaceutical ﬁrms that compete horizontally in Japan, the competition eect of
alliances is examined. For pharmaceutical products, it is easy to ascertain whether a particular drug is
supplied by the originator or a partner ﬁrm (licensee). If a drug is supplied by the partner ﬁrm, we can
learn not only the name of the distributing partner but also that of the originator ﬁrm. Therefore, I can
identify any dierences that exist in supply conditions and pricing behavior between a ﬁrm’s own and
alliance products in the pharmaceutical market.
There are eectively no trade barriers in Japan because of agreements related to the WTO. However,
the dierences in regulations between Japan and other countries were recognized and considered to
impose possible entry barriers. The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) published “The Survey
on Actual Conditions Regarding Access To Japan – Pharmaceuticals” concerning this issue in 1998.
This report was released immediately before my sample period; thus, the changes in regulations and
market environment made during my sample period reﬂect its inﬂuence. The main point related to
distribution activities is that approval systems vary among the EU, Japan, and the US.
As in the EU and the US, pharmaceutical products require approval for sale. However, the necessary
approval license is dierent in Japan. In the EU and the US, ﬁrms selling drugs on the market require
approval. In contrast, in Japan pharmaceutical ﬁrms supplying drugs presumably own manufacturing
plants, and therefore the ﬁrms that sell drugs were expected to be approved as manufacturers. Thus,
there was no possibility of outsourcing entire manufacturing processes and selling drugs. In addition,
6importers “must obtain an import and sales business license from the Minister of Health and Welfare”1
and had to obtain approval for each product. In addition, if importers sold drugs to medical institutions,
they had to obtain a wholesale business license. In contrast, no license is required for import into EU
countries and the US. Thus, before 2005, approval at multiple levels was required, and was thus consid-
ered to impose additional costs. Under the 2005 revision of the Pharmaceutical Aair Act, distributors
need to be authorized, while manufacturers not engaging in distribution activities do not need approval.
This approval system is similar to those of the EU and the US. Importer licenses are no longer required.
Authorized distributors can import drugs on the Drug Master File (DMF) list. Thus, distribution costs
are saved by eliminating multiple business licenses and regulations about pure manufacturing factories.
Another important point in the Japanese market is price regulation. Retail prices are regulated and
set by the Japanese government. However, because wholesale prices are determined by pharmaceutical
companies, there is still price competition in wholesale prices. Thus, I examine pricing behavior in
wholesale markets. The vertical structure in Japanese pharmaceutical distribution is such that manufac-
turers must ﬁrst sell drugs to wholesalers, which then supply them to hospitals. Before 1991, when the
Japanese antimonopoly laws were amended, manufacturers could control the prices that wholesalers
were able to set for hospitals. Such exclusive exercises are now prohibited. Then, while the manufac-
turers determined a single price for their wholesalers, the prices to hospitals were determined by the
wholesalers. We consider the prices when manufacturers sell drugs to their wholesalers. Because a sub-
stantial proportion of doctors prescribe and dispense drugs, they may care not only about the wholesale
price, but also about retail (dispensed)–wholesale price margins. Because this stimulates demand for
drugs, as Iizuka (2007) showed, it may be necessary to take physician margins into account.
Iizuka (2007) derives the wholesale price using a regulatory formula for retail prices. The pricing
1From “The survey on actual conditions regarding access to Japan pharmaceutical,” page 1, published by JETRO.
7formula for retail price at year t is given by the regulatory form every two years: Pt = Wt 1 + RPt 1,
where Pt is the retail price, Wt 1 is the wholesale price collected and calculated by the government, and
R = 0:02, setbythegovernment. Hence, wecan derivewholesalepricesfromWt 1 = Pt RPt 1. While,
as in Iizuka (2007), the price data can be derived from this formula, I use the actual wholesale prices in a
particularwholesalemarketinTokyo, Kanda. Thedrugpricesetbymanufacturersiscalledthebulkhead
price. However, based on sales volumes and information on drug sales provided to manufacturers,
rebates are paid to wholesalers. Thus, the actual price will be lower than the bulkhead price. The
market in Kanda can be regarded as one between wholesalers. The transactions in this market are
made in cash, and drugs are supplied and demanded at prices at which rebates may be taken into
account. Therefore, the prices in this market may reﬂect actual trading wholesale prices. I use the price
of a particular type of form (capsule, tablet, or granule) reported by the publisher of Information on
International Pharmaceuticals. Two products, Banan and Modacine, are supplied by both the originator
and the partner ﬁrm. Prior to 2003, the partner ﬁrms’ prices were not reported. Because in other periods
the prices of the originator and partner ﬁrms are often the same, I set the pre-2003 prices at the same
level. In addition, the type of delivery of one drug, Pansporin, was changed so that the wholesale price
is adjusted by the associated ratio of retail prices. In the estimations, the prices are deﬂated by the
producer price index.
Because my sample includes many forms of drugs, prices need to have a common basis. As in
the previous study (Stern (1996)), I use patient per-day price. Per-day prices for patients are derived
by calculating the required dose multiplied by the unit price of each drug based on the recommended
dosage. I then use sales of each drug to obtain quantity. Dividing sales by per-day price yields quantity,
which is the number of patients in each year. Then, the number of patients is divided by the total number
of patients to derive market share of each product. Because I have no data on the likelihood of diseases,
8I use several measures of total number of patients. Total market size is from the Patient Survey by
the Japanese government, and uses the estimated number of patients in Japan. Because I classify two
groups of drugs (oral and injectable), the within-group shares are also calculated.
One feature of my data is that it does not capture all products in each market. However, our data
cover the majority share in the market. For example, in 2004 the sample includes more than 90 percent
of the market share of sales in this therapy area (the total value of sales of the sample drugs is 324.3
billion yen, while that of total sales in this therapy area is 350.6 billion yen). This may be sucient
for estimating strategic behavior by large companies. In addition, my data do not cover generic drugs,
because they are still not widely available in Japan, and my focus is on the alliance activities in brand
drugs. As long as there are beneﬁts from alliances, generic entry may not drastically change supply
mode choice. In fact, some drugs supplied through alliances (for example, “Kefral” is supplied by
Shionogi and the originator is Eli Lilly) face generic drug entry, but other drugs supplied by independent
ﬁrms also face generic entry (for example, “Ciproxan” supplied by Bayer). This fact also supports the
view that ﬁrms do not simply form alliances for patent expired products, nor do they supply patented
drugs independently.
== Table 1 Here ==
Table 1 reports summary statistics for drugs. The oldest drug was launched in 1971 and the newest
in 2002. Half-life is an indication of a drug’s characteristics, and is the time required for a drug concen-
tration to be reduced by 50 percent. Indication is the sum of the number of approved indications and the
number of target bacteria. Contraindication is the number of contraindicated conditions. Foreign is a
dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 when foreign companies supply the drug. These character-
istics are used in Iizuka (2007). By comparing the oral and injectable drug prices, per-day price varies
widely for injectable drugs.
9The dierences in the prices of drugs obtained through alliances and by a ﬁrm’s own supply are
shown in Table 2. The simple average price of a ﬁrm’s own drug is lower than that for one obtained
through alliances for oral drugs, but this is higher for injectable drugs. Thus, ﬁrms do not simply
supply low-price drugs through alliances. However, their own and alliance products can dier in market
penetration as a consequence. If their own supply has an advantage in obtaining large market share
compared with supply through alliance, share-weighted prices will be higher for their ownproducts than
for the products of alliances. The lower half of Table 2 reports share-weighted prices. The weighted
average prices of ﬁrms’ own products are higher than those of alliance products. This implies that
alliance products tend to have low market share, while that of ﬁrms’ own products is higher. The
market share, i.e., market penetration, diers among distribution channels, so the choice of distribution
channel is critical for raising revenues in this market.
== Table 2 Here ==
This fact is consistent with foreign ﬁrms’ strategies in recent years. Foreign ﬁrms reorganized their
subsidiaries by merging with other ﬁrms and establishing distribution subsidiaries during my sample
period. Once foreign ﬁrms can establish sucient distribution ability, their sales strategy changes from
alliance to direct supply. There was a trend for cross-border alliance contracts to be terminated, and
foreign ﬁrms tended to supply the drugs independently.
The estimations use pooled data over a period of years. The factors of consumer choice speciﬁc to
each year are controlled by year dummies. While the prescribing behavior may not change drastically
over time, time-speciﬁc shocks can be taken into account by time-speciﬁc eects.
103 Model
I estimate a discrete choice model of demand developed by Berry (1994). Pharmaceutical demand esti-
mation is considered within this framework by Stern (1996) and Iizuka (2007). While retail prices are
regulated in the Japanese drug market, wholesale prices are set by pharmaceutical companies. Choice of
drug is made by doctors, and my concern is their sensitivity to wholesale prices when prescribing drugs.
In Japan, a large number of doctors prescribe and dispense drugs to their patients, and thus doctors can
proﬁt from retail–wholesale price margins. Although the separation of prescribing and dispensing has
been pursued, even at the end of my sample period in 2006, about 45 percent of drugs were dispensed
by doctors.2 In addition, as Iizuka (2007) shows, while the Japanese doctors may care about the costs
to patients when they prescribe drugs, their decisions are inﬂuenced by the margins between retail and
wholesale prices. Thus, doctors may be sensitive not only to wholesale prices, but also to physician
margins. This element is also taken into account when considering drug demand.




Vij = xj + pj + j + ij;
where xj is product characteristics, pj is price, j is unobservable product characteristics, and ij is an
error term. xj may include physician margins. Because retail and wholesale prices are highly correlated
in the data, simply including retail price causes a multicollinearity problem in the estimations. Instead,
markup rates, i.e., retail minus wholesale prices divided by wholesale prices, are introduced. Let j
denote mean utility, j = xj + pj + j. The mean utility for outside goods is normalized to zero,
0 = 0. The error term has a group-speciﬁc component: ij = g() + (1   )ij.  is a measure of the
2Japan Pharmaceutical Association website, http://www.nichiyaku.or.jp/index.html (in Japanese).
11group-speciﬁc eect, showing the within-group correlation. In my sample, there are two types of drugs
in a broad sense, oral and injectable. Thus, I divide drugs into these two groups.
Assuming that the error term follows extreme distribution, the market share is expressed by a nested
logit form (see Berry (1994)):








j2g exp(j=(1   )). We estimate the following equation:
lnS j   lnS 0 = xj + pj + S jjg + j;
where S jjg is within-group share. Because price, physician markup, and within-market share are en-
dogenous, we require an instrumental variable estimation.
Following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Iizuka (2007), the sum of product characteristics
for other ﬁrms’ products and product characteristics of other products sold by the ﬁrm are used as instru-
ments. Because of oligopolistic interaction among pharmaceutical ﬁrms, the presence of substitutable
goods aects the wholesale price. In addition, because multi-product ﬁrms choose prices to maximize
total proﬁts, their prices depend on the characteristics of their other products. I also use information on
foreign supply and competition intensiveness.3 In the pharmaceutical industry, product characteristics
are determined by research processes. This stage is before the pricing decision stage; therefore, product
characteristics are considered to be exogenous.
My principal assumption is that alliance choices are made before pricing decisions. In other words,
alliances are exogenous when ﬁrms set prices. This holds well if ﬁrms’ decisions on forming alliances
3The instruments are the sum of drug age, number of indications, number of contraindications, and half-life. Another
characteristic of a product supplied by an independent ﬁrm is the ratio of other products’ half-lives to their own product’s
half-life. The number of foreign ﬁrms and number of products are also used.
12takes place before pricing decisions. How alliance agreements are determined is an interesting question,
but is beyond the scope of this paper.
First, ﬁrms are assumed to compete in a static Bertrand fashion. Collusion cases are considered
later. The ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts by choosing the prices of each drug in each year. In general,
ﬁrms produce multiple products. Thus, the proﬁt functions for an originator ﬁrm k and a partner ﬁrm k0








(pj   cj)S(pj; p j)M   F0;
where F and F0 are total ﬁxed fees. For the originator ﬁrm, this F is not cost, but contributes to revenue.




(pj   cj)(@S i=@pj) + S j = 0:
In matrix notation, 
(p   c) + S = 0, where p is the price vector, c is the marginal cost vector, S is
the share vector, and 
 is the matrix of price derivatives of market share. In the nested logit model, the
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S j(1   S jjg   (1   )S j)=(1   ) if i = j
 S j(S ijg + (1   )S i)=(1   ) if i , j;i; j 2 g
 S iS j if i 2 g; j 2 g0;g , g0:
The price–cost margins are implied by the ﬁrst-order conditions: p   c = 
 1S. Similarly, marginal
costs can also be derived: c = p 
 1S. In the pharmaceutical industry, R&D costs are the major costs,
and are sunk when supplying drugs, so that marginal costs of production may be negligible. In fact,
13R&D spending usually accounts for about 10 percent of revenues for large pharmaceutical companies.
However, from ﬁnancial reports of pharmaceutical companies, not only production but also distribution
costs take a signiﬁcant share of revenues, so my implied marginal costs reﬂect these.4
One remark should be made here. Although my focus is on the dierences in local supply costs
between domestic and foreign ﬁrms, that between distribution and production costs is not identiﬁed.
It may happen that while distribution costs of domestic and foreign ﬁrms are similar, foreign produc-
tion costs are higher, and thus foreign supply costs appear to be higher than domestic supply costs.
Therefore, our study investigates overall supply costs, including distribution and production costs.
With respect to royalty payments, I simply assume that a portion of sales is paid to originator ﬁrms.









where the subscript m indicates licensed products. Thus, partner ﬁrms discount their sales by . They
do not take pjS jM as revenue from product j, but take (1   )pjS jM as a base for revenues. At the
same time, originator ﬁrms receive pjS jM as royalty payments. For simplicity, the same  is applied
to all alliances in a market.
One important issue here concerns the reality of the royalty payment form I use. In the literature,
dierent licensing contract forms, such as ﬁxed-fee only, royalty only, and two-part taris, are reported
(Macho-Stadler, Martinez-Giralt, and Perez-Castrillo (1996)). While the details of alliance contracts
are not generally publicly available, we have supplemental evidence about alliance contracts in which
US pharmaceutical ﬁrms are involved. In the US, public companies must ﬁle a report to the SEC
about important contracts. Hence, supporting examples of alliance contracts between big pharmaceu-
4Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia (2005) derive upper and lower marginal costs of Indian pharmaceutical ﬁrms considering
perfect competition and monopoly, respectively.
14tical companies may be found. Basically, both ﬁxed-fee and per-unit royalty alliance contract types
are found. For example, the report of the alliance contract between Genelabs and Tanabe (a Japanese
company, now Mitsubishi–Tanabe) documents that the royalty payments are determined by the follow-
ing per-unit royalty rule: “** percent of the portion of annual Net Sales for such calendar year which
are equal to or less than U.S. ** dollars” (** are sealed).5 This alliance covers broad activities such as
patent licensing, know-how transfer and commercialization.
The use of both ﬁxed fees and royalty payments is found. For example, the copromotion agreement
between Santarus and Otsuka includes upfront payments, which correspond to our ﬁxed fees, milestone
payments, which are payments contingent on market sales, and royalties. The royalties are speciﬁed
as follows: “an amount equal to [***] percent [***] (the “Royalty”) multiplied by Net Sales”, where
“Net Sales” correspond to our sales variable.6 Therefore, both ﬁxed-fee and per-unit royalty rates are
used. My speciﬁcation of alliance contracts can be considered a simpliﬁed version of such payment
schemes. Thus, my speciﬁcation that there is a ﬁxed fee, F, and  portion of sales is paid to the
licenser simpliﬁes the actual alliance contracts among pharmaceutical companies, but is not unrealistic.
While some agreements may be based on R&D spending, if these costs are proportional to sales, my
speciﬁcation does not deviate greatly.
To provide an idea of how equilibrium behavior changes according to form of payment, consider an
example of three ﬁrms and four products: products 1 and 2 are supplied by ﬁrm 1, product 3 is supplied
by ﬁrm 2, product 2 is licensed to ﬁrm 1 by ﬁrm 2, and product four is supplied by ﬁrm 3. Then, the
5Thisdocumentisavailableathttp://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/874443/000095013404006962/f98659exv10w17.txt.
6This is available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1172480/000095013704009765/a03105exv10w5.txt.
15ﬁrst-order conditions under per-unit royalty rates are given by:
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= 0:
In general, using matrix notation, this is expressed by: 
(Jp   c) + ˜ S = 0, where ˜ S is S with partial
derivatives included if the product is licensed out, and J is the identity matrix whose (i;i) element is
1    if the ith product is obtained through an alliance. Therefore, the implied marginal costs are given
by c = Jp   
 1 ˜ S. Given dierent values of , the corresponding implied marginal costs are derived.
These implied marginal costs yield the margins p   c. Note that because of common  the eects of
royalty rates should be interpreted as market average eect.
The market competition mode has been assumed to be a static Bertrand. There is no information on
the actual competition mode. Therefore, I also consider collusion schemes, and derive ﬁrm behavior.
Twotypes of collusion are considered. One is a fully collusive scheme, where a hypothetical monopolist
maximizes the joint proﬁts, and the other is partial collusion, in which ﬁrms forming alliances are
considered single ﬁrms.
The full collusion case is extreme. All ﬁrms in this market collude. Because, in this market, more
than 30 percent of products are supplied through alliances, if the prominence of alliances leads to col-
lusive behavior in a whole market, this full collusion scheme may arise. The hypothetical monopolist’s
16proﬁt maximization condition in the above example is expressed by:
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The partial collusion case is more reasonable than the full collusion case. If, in fact, ﬁrms in alliance
collude, their decisions may resemble those of a single ﬁrm. In my example, if ﬁrms forming alliances
maximize their joint proﬁts, ﬁrms 1 and 2 are considered a single ﬁrm, and products 1, 2, and 3 are
considered to be supplied by that ﬁrm. Therefore, the FOC is:
0
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I derive marginal costs under competition and collusion schemes and regress the marginal costs on
product and ﬁrm characteristics. We cannot detect competition modes separately from marginal costs
because of the data limitation of marginal costs. Rather, the estimates of functions under collusion and
alliances are compared to determine the function that best ﬁts the data, and then the best-ﬁt case is
chosen as the prevailing competition mode.
The comparison between competition and collusion using pricing equations has been conducted
by Goldberg and Verboven (2001). In this paper, I use a similar approach to Bresnahan (1987), Villas-
Boas (2007), and Bonnet and Dubois (2008) to test whether this market is competitive or colluded under
alliances by ﬁtting functions to marginal costs. Because the estimated parameters in functions may be
biased without cost data, as Corts (1999) and Genesove and Mullin (1998) show, I do not provide an
interpretation of each parameter, but examine the ﬁt of each model. I use the Vuong (1989) test to
17examine which competing model ﬁts the data best. One useful aspect of this test is that each model can
be misspeciﬁed, which may hold in our case.
4 Results
4.1 Demand Estimation
Table 3 reports demand estimation results. Columns 2 and 3 report logit demand estimation results, and
columns 4 to 7 report nested logit demand estimation results.
In column 2, OLS estimation results show that the coecient of price is negative and signiﬁcant.
Therefore, doctors are sensitive to drug prices, and thus a drug demand function is found. In column
3, the IV estimation results of the same speciﬁcation are reported. The price coecient is also signif-
icantly negative. A comparison of columns 2 and 3 shows that the price coecient is underestimated
in OLS. This ﬁnding is consistent with the case that prices are correlated with unobservable product
characteristics.
Similar results are obtained in the nested logit estimations. Columns 4 and 5 report the results of
nested logit estimations. The price coecients are signiﬁcantly negative. In the nested logit estimations,
the price coecient is also underestimated in OLS. The within-share coecients are about 0.54 and
signiﬁcant. Therefore, the drug-type choice is consistent with consumer behavior, and signiﬁcant for
drug demand. The magnitude of the within-share coecient is smaller in OLS than in IV. The similar
bias to price coecient estimations exists in within-share estimations. The overidentifying restrictions
test is satisﬁed (2(3) = 5:021 and the p-value is 0.17), therefore the instruments are valid.
Columns 6 and 7 in Table 3 report the results when physician margins are included. The estimation
results are qualitatively similar to other results. While the coecient of wholesale price is negative,
that of markup rate is positive in the IV estimation in Column 7. This may indicate that physicians’
18demand behavior depends on the wholesale price negatively and on their margins positively, however
the eect of physician margins is statistically insigniﬁcant. The coecients of product characteristics
reﬂect consumer preferences for antibiotic drugs in Japan.7
Because this is a semi-log linear demand model, the marginal eect of a 1 percent price increase is
0:07  15:1 = 1:057 when evaluated at the average drug price, 15.1 (in 100 yen). Because retail prices
are regulated, wholesale price competition must be restricted by regulation. Therefore, the demand
function is not very elastic with price.
== Table 3 Here ==
4.2 Implied Marginal Costs and Markups
From the demand estimations, I derive markups and marginal costs. My focus is on the average dier-
ences at the market level between products obtained through alliances and ﬁrms’ own products. There-
fore, I examine aggregate markups using a weighted average of markups (see for example, Ohashi
(2002)). The market-level markups are calculated as follows: s0(p c) = s0
 1S, where s is the within-
drug supply pattern (alliance, ﬁrm’s own, or foreign supply) share,
P
j2f sj = 1, j denotes each drug,
and f denotes each supply pattern. The weighted average of markups in each year is calculated by using
shares as weights.
Toshowthestatisticalsigniﬁcanceofmyresults, Figures1and2displaytheﬁfthand95thpercentile
points of marginal costs and markups, respectively, by using the Monte Carlo method. I generate 100
draws from a normal distribution for the demand estimates to construct a 90 percent conﬁdence interval.
7My demand estimation is similar to that of Iizuka (2007), in which the demand for hypertension drugs is estimated.
While the coecients of the indication and half-life variables show the opposite sign to those in Iizuka (2007), this may be
because these studies are concerned with dierent classes of drugs. For antibiotics, because of resistant bacteria, the number
of indications and half-lives may not reﬂect the quality of the drugs.
19Figure 1 shows that marginal costs of products supplied through cross-border alliances are lower than
those supplied by foreign ﬁrms. This implies that local manufacturing ﬁrms may have a cost advantage
in distribution, and reveals that a ﬁrm’s alliance strategies are based on eciency. If partner ﬁrms have
low costs, it is beneﬁcial for originator ﬁrms to supply through alliances and raise proﬁts by imposing
licensing fees.
== Figure 1 Here ==
The cost dierences between domestic supply, alliance, and foreign supplies are not caused by price
dierences alone. As Table 2 reports, the average price of domestic supply products is lower than that
of foreign supply and alliances, except for foreign alliance injectable drugs. Because prices reﬂect drug
qualitytosomeextent, foreignﬁrmsdonotsimplyoutsourcelow-qualityproductsandkeephigh-quality
goods for themselves. In addition, the share-weighted prices of foreign supply and alliance products
are lower than of those supplied domestically. Therefore, the distribution channel aects market share,
and thus market penetration.
Figure 1 also shows that as years pass, marginal cost dierences narrow, and in particular costs
of foreign ﬁrms’ own supply decrease8. This salient feature reﬂects the changes in regulations and
foreign supply conditions. There was a revision of the Japanese Pharmaceutical Aair Act in 2005. As
discussed above, distributors need to be authorized, and pure manufacturers do not require approval for
sales. Thus, foreign ﬁrms face a similar regulatory system to that in their home countries. In addition,
the business license system was simpliﬁed. There is no longer an importer license, and authorized
distributors can import drugs on the DMF list. This deregulation may reduce foreign ﬁrms’ supply
8Note that because one in seven product alliances is between domestic ﬁrms, a similar computation using not only cross-
border but also domestic alliance products applies. The results of marginal costs of domestic alliances and foreign alliances
are shown not to be signiﬁcantly dierent. Therefore, my results imply that domestic own supply is the most ecient method
for sales.
20costs.
The foreign ﬁrms’ cost changes may also be because of their subsidiary restructuring and distribu-
tion strategies. Around 2002 and 2003, the subsidiaries of foreign pharmaceutical companies in Japan
were reorganized. Because of the merger between Pﬁzer and Pharmacia, the Japanese subsidiaries were
also merged in 2003. In the same year, Abbott Japan was established by merging Dainabot (Abbott
and Dainippon Seiyaku JV) and Hokuriku Seiyaku. BMS built a distribution subsidiary in 2002. This
type of restructuring occurred in the Sanoﬁ Aventis and GSK subsidiaries in Japan (GSK’s Japanese
subsidiary became a 100 percent subsidiary in 2006 and Aventis Pharma KK and Sanoﬁ Synthelabo
KK merged to create Sanoﬁ Aventis KK in 2006 in Japan). Merck had a 49 percent share of a Japanese
pharmaceutical company, Banyu, and acquired full ownership in 2004. Therefore, foreign ﬁrms may
reduce the disadvantage of supplying their own drugs in Japan.
Associatedwithforeignsubsidiaryreorganizations, foreignﬁrms’distributionstrategieshavechanged.
It has been documented that foreign ﬁrms with distribution ability began to terminate alliance contracts
and supply drugs by themselves to a greater extent than previously. In 2006, the originator ﬁrms of two
alliance products, Lulid and Modacine, Sanoﬁ Aventis and GSK, became the suppliers. Thus, foreign
organizations and strategies were drastically changed at this time. As mentioned in the introduction,
promotion of pharmaceuticals to doctors by MRs is an important sales channel in Japan. Reorganizing
subsidiaries yields a sucient number of MRs. If this reorganization improves distribution resources
and abilities, local supply costs can be decreased. Once foreign ﬁrms establish sucient capacity for
distribution, they will choose the most proﬁtable distribution channel. This leads to a reduction in
foreign supply costs, and only high-cost products are supplied through alliances. This point will be
discussed in more detail below. Moreover, there was a trend in M&A among Japanese pharmaceuti-
cal wholesalers. Before the 1990s, manufacturers had a close relationship with particular wholesalers.
21However, after wholesalers were reorganized, each wholesaler traded with more manufacturers than
previously. This also gave foreign ﬁrms a chance of creating a distributional channel.
So far, ﬁrms have been assumed to conduct Bertrand competition, however an alternative ﬁrm inter-
action should be taken into account: collusion. Two possible collusion schemes are examined: full and
partial collusion. I use the inversion formula, c = p  ˆ 
 1S, to derive marginal costs, where ˆ 
 is a price
derivative matrix under a collusion scheme. I found that marginal costs and margins are positive, so I
cannot reject collusion schemes by simply deriving marginal costs, because the results do not conﬂict
with proﬁt maximizing behavior. In the following section, by regressing the marginal costs on product
characteristics, I test whether collusion schemes are rejected in favor of competition schemes.
While in Figure 1 the two percentiles of the marginal costs do not overlap, Figure 2 shows that these
intervals of markups do overlap. No signiﬁcant dierence between markups is found. The average
markup rates are quite low: 0.5 to 2 percent. This may be because the antibiotics market in Japan is
a mature market. The regulated retail price will be set with a suciently large margin when a new
drug is launched. However, many antibiotics were launched before 2000, so the regulated retail prices
were reset at a low level. For example, Cefdinir, a cephalosporin antibiotic, was launched in 1991.
The ﬁrst regulated per-patient-day price was approximately 500 yen. However, in the 2000s, the prices
were reset to approximately 200 yen. Production and distribution costs have not drastically decreased;
therefore, the average margins are low in my sample period.
== Figure 2 Here ==
Similar results are obtained by considering the partial collusion case (Figure 3). Under the partial
collusion case, these markups do not dier from the competition case. Even if ﬁrms forming alliances
cooperate, market distortions may not be severe compared with the competition case. However, if we
assume that all ﬁrms in this market collude, then margins are signiﬁcantly higher than other competition
22and collusion cases (Figure 4). Therefore, it may be crucial to identify what kind of ﬁrm conduct
prevails to assess eciency in this market.
== Figure 3 Here ==
== Figure 4 Here ==
5 Alliance and Collusion Schemes
In this section, ﬁrst, I use a positive royalty rate and derive markups consistent with it. Hence, my
numerical examination detects marginal costs and price–cost margins consistent with the preset royalty
rate by using observed price, quantity, and demand structures. Then, I test which alliance scheme,
only ﬁxed fee or positive royalty rate, or collusion scheme, full collusion or partial collusion, is most
consistent with the data. Because I have limited data, my approach is similar to that of Villas-Boas
(2007) and Bonnet and Dubois (2008), who examined retail pricing behaviors without wholesale price
data. The comparison between collusion and competition was conducted by Goldberg and Verboven





Firms set their prices with these payments taken into account. The FOCs with respect to prices are given
by maximizing the proﬁt function (1). This allowed me to solve for the marginal costs, c, then derive
price–cost margins, p   c.
I employ a numerical examination by using the positive value of . Figure 5 shows the average
market margins when  = 0:1. By comparing these with the results when  = 0 in the previous sec-
tion, my numerical examination demonstrates that high royalty rates are consistent with high markups.
23Margins are signiﬁcantly dierent between alliances and ﬁrms’ own products. This result suggests that
the presence of royalty rates aects pricing behavior. Therefore, my results conﬁrm a public policy
trade-o between beneﬁts from entry through alliances and costs of high markups when high royalty
rates are imposed.
== Figure 5 Here ==
The remaining issue concerns whether high distortion is in fact realized in this market. High distor-
tion can also be caused by collusion, as shown in Figure 4. In the following, I compare competition and
collusion cases by ﬁtting the functions to marginal costs, and test which case is more consistent with
the data.
5.2 Tests on Alliance and Collusion Schemes
Because there is no information about competition mode in this market, it is not clear whether competi-
tion or collusion prevails in this market. If data on actual margins were available, tests of competition or
collusion could be conducted by comparing actual margins and theoretical margins derived from com-
petition schemes as in Ohashi (2002). In this study, however, because of this limited information, I use
a similar method to that of Villas-Boas (2007), where wholesale price schemes (e.g., linear or nonlinear
pricing) are investigated without wholesale price data. Instead of pricing schemes, I investigate whether
a competition scheme is more consistent with the data than a collusion model. A similar exercise is
performed by Goldberg and Verboven (2001) in examining whether the UK car market is colluded or
not by comparing pricing equations under competition and collusion schemes.
Using implied marginal costs enables us to examine the ﬁt of each model to the data. The log of the
marginal cost of product i is assumed to be linear in product characteristics:
lnci = wi + i;
24where ci is marginal costs, wi is the matrix of covariates, and  is the parameter vector. To take into
account the kinds of elements that aect marginal costs, I use product characteristics as covariates.
In addition, the index of foreign subsidiary reorganizations is incorporated to capture the eects of
reorganization on supply costs. This variable takes a value of 1 after subsidiary reorganization.
By considering competition and setting several royalty rates ( = 0;0:05;0:1 and 0:5) and consider-
ing collusion schemes, the corresponding implied marginal costs are calculated. I regress marginal cost
on the covariates by maximum likelihood and consider which estimate ﬁts the data better. As mentioned
above, interpretations of each parameter are not shown, but overall ﬁt of the function is examined. Be-
cause the data generating process of marginal costs is dierent between alliance and collusion models, I
use a nonnested model selection test statistic. Table 4 reports results for the Vuong test (Vuong (1989)).
The Vuong test is based on a likelihood ratio test and makes a pairwise comparison between two mod-
els. This test statistic has standard normal distribution. The test statistics are in each cell of Table 4
and the chosen model is denoted in parentheses. If this statistic is positive and large, the model in the
column is chosen, and if negative and large, the model in the row is chosen.
Table 4 shows that zero royalty rates are not rejected for all collusion schemes. The results for
positive royalty rates, 5 and 10 percent, are not decisive. On the other hand, 50 percent royalty rates
are rejected by the partial collusion scheme. This implies that actual average royalty rates are less than
50 percent. Therefore, my results suggest that my sample alliances do not have high royalty rates, and
may even have only ﬁxed fees. While this result is obtained under the condition that all alliances have
a common value of , it can be interpreted that on average low royalty rates are imposed, and therefore
there may be a small margin in this market.
Table 4 also reports the results of a comparison among the collusion schemes. The full collusion
scheme is rejected by the partial collusion case. The partial collusion case is that in which alliance ﬁrms
25are considered a single ﬁrm. The partial collusion case is not rejected by competition schemes, except
for the zero royalty case. Even if there are only ﬁxed fees, alliance agreements can increase the threat
of punishment through an alliance in a repeated game situation (Lin (1996)). However, my test results
indicate that in this market, pharmaceutical ﬁrms do not collude using ﬁxed-fee contracts. These test
results are robust under the dierent speciﬁcations of the function, such as including time dummies.
== Table 4 ==
Theoretically, the weak anticompetitive eects are due to product characteristics and market seg-
mentation. If products are a close substitute and ﬁrms compete in price, royalty rates will be high, and
thus prices charged will also be high (Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002)). On the other hand, if products
are not substituted and markets are segmented, the industry gains from supplying new products may
dominate the loss in industry proﬁts (Tirole (1988)). Therefore, empirical results suggest that in the
Japanese antibiotics market, independently developed drugs and alliance drugs are well dierentiated.
Moreover, because cross-border alliances prevail in this market, the majority of originator ﬁrms forming
alliances are foreign ﬁrms, so the risk of cannibalization of their own product sales is low. There may
be less need to manipulate marginal costs to maintain competitive advantage in the product market, or
to collude.
6 Conclusion
This study has examined the relationship between cross-border alliances and market competition. By
estimating demand for antibiotics and considering Bertrand competition, I derive markups and marginal
costs. My estimations show that the marginal costs of products through alliances and products that
foreign ﬁrms supply by themselves are signiﬁcantly dierent. This suggests systematic dierences in
supply modes. However, foreign supply costs are decreased when foreign subsidiary reorganizations
26andregulatoryreformsoccur. Furthermore, withroyaltypayments, highroyaltyratesareconsistentwith
high markups. Because my empirical tests suggest that royalty rates can be zero, distortions caused by
high markups may not be severe in this market. Empirical tests also indicate that ﬁrms are not colluded.
Therefore, the anticompetitive eects of alliance are not found in this market.
Because trade barriers, such as taris, tend to be reduced because of WTO or free trade agreements,
nontari barriers become signiﬁcant. This paper deals with the issue that local supply costs may be a
burden for foreign ﬁrms. As our results suggest, foreign supply costs may have decreased when domes-
tic regulatory reforms came into eect. Thus, liberalizing the distribution sector will be an important
trade negotiation issue. Our results indicate that further liberalizations may improve eciency.
With respect to supply costs of domestic and foreign ﬁrms, my results demonstrate that while for-
eign supply costs decreased, domestic supply costs increased slightly. Even though Japanese pharma-
ceutical companies engaged in M&A activities in my sample period, synergy eects were not realized.
Because my empirical tests imply that collusion does not seem to occur in this market, a pro-M&A or
pro-alliance policy may be required.
My empirical study attempts to examine the signiﬁcance of the eects of alliance on competition,
and thus shed light on the quantitative eect of alliance on ﬁrm pricing behavior, which is a major
issue in the antitrust literature. Because this study is, to my knowledge, the ﬁrst attempt to examine the
relationship between alliance and market competition, there are still many important issues remaining.
In this paper, royalty rates are treated as given and empirically tested. Royalty rates reﬂect bargaining
powers of originators and partners, and therefore aect entry patterns. It would be interesting to inves-
tigate how royalty rates are determined. This requires a model for bargaining, and is thus a topic for
future research.
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30Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Average Std Min Max
ﬁrst year 1989.241 5.39523 1971 2002
half-life 3.378 6.917 0.5 62
indication 42.714 13.179 14 69
contraindication 1.349 1.558 0 5
foreign 0.228 0.421 0 1
per-day price (oral) 561.233 904.466 108 3800
per-day price (injection) 3828.15 3678.806 1290 15200
share 0.012 0.017 0.0001 0.076
num. of obs = 241
num. of oral = 171
Year 1999–2006
Table 2: Summary Statistics II
Price Average Std Min Max Obs
Own (oral) 526.786 816 108 3760 132
Own (injectable) 3930.071 3866.8 1290 15200 63
Domestic Own (oral) 513.097 801.289 108 3760 101
Domestic Own (injectable) 4810.474 4715.244 1290 15200 39
Alliance (oral) 677.822 1160.271 144.9 3800 39
Alliance (injectable) 2910.857 201.077 2646 3200 7
Foreign Alliance (oral) 698.49 1206.604 144.9 3800 36
Foreign Alliance (injectable) 2910.857 201.077 2646 3200 7
Foreign Supply (oral) 571.387 874.442 151.2 3255 31
Foreign Supply (injectable) 2499.417 349.307 1860 3200 24
Weighted Price
Own (oral) 4.866 5.15 0.157 19.647 132
Own (injectable) 4.506 2.53 1.018 9.119 63
Domestic Own (oral) 5.814 5.463 0.235 19.647 101
Domestic Own (injectable) 5.644 2.34 2.583 9.119 39
Alliance (oral) 2.206 1.857 0.157 6.536 39
Alliance (injectable) 1.297 0.492 0.313 1.879 7
Foreign Alliance (oral) 2.346 1.866 0.157 6.536 36
Foreign Alliance (injectable) 1.297 0.492 0.313 1.879 7
Foreign Supply (oral) 1.779 1.862 0.157 7.436 31
Foreign Supply (injectable) 2.656 1.562 1.018 5.871 24
31Table 3: Demand Estimation
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
price (in 100 yen) -0.032c -0.044c -0.031c -0.064c -0.031c -0.071c
(0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.015)
Drug Age -0.069c -0.078c -0.084c -0.104c -0.085c -0.113c
(0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015)
Half Life 0.013 0.006 0.003 -0.015 0.012 -0.043
(0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.048)
Indication -0.030c -0.039c -0.038c -0.061c -0.038c -0.071c
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.013)
Contraindication -0.038 -0.052 -0.018 -0.060 -0.021 -0.054
(0.056) (0.054) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.046)
Foreign supply -1.157c -1.154c -0.878c -0.917c -0.856c -0.848c
(0.186) (0.155) (0.139) (0.232) (0.139) (0.253)
year2000dummy -0.046 -0.034 0.001 0.027 -0.046 0.159
(0.314) (0.286) (0.231) (0.301) (0.232) (0.466)
year2001dummy 0.103 0.132 0.247 0.302 0.226 0.427
(0.316) (0.287) (0.233) (0.309) (0.232) (0.408)
year2002dummy 0.008 0.045 0.137 0.215 0.017 0.561
(0.321) (0.304) (0.237) (0.312) (0.248) (0.706)
year2003dummy -0.031 0.020 0.224 0.321 0.156 0.614
(0.321) (0.308) (0.238) (0.333) (0.241) (0.567)
year2004dummy -0.201 -0.151 0.169 0.243 0.066 0.663
(0.313) (0.317) (0.232) (0.367) (0.240) (0.759)
year2005dummy -0.030 0.033 0.388 0.490 0.339 0.815
(0.317) (0.324) (0.236) (0.386) (0.237) (0.590)
year2006dummy 0.031 0.106 0.442a 0.578 0.303 1.113
(0.324) (0.331) (0.240) (0.403) (0.255) (0.940)
Within share 0.650c 0.541a 0.653c 0.807b
(0.047) (0.304) (0.047) (0.329)
Markup rate -0.762 1.711
(0.476) (3.416)
Constant -17.889c -17.195c -15.733c -14.206c -15.454c -13.482c
(0.445) (0.510) (0.363) (1.346) (0.402) (1.410)
R-squared 0.400 0.359 0.674 0.366 0.676 0.158
Chi square p value 0.09 0.17 0.104
N 241 241 241 241 241 241
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and a, b, and c indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Table 4: Vuong Test
Partial Col Full Col
 = 0 3.519 (0) 48.146 (0)
 = 0:05 -1.495 (?) 21.334 (0.05)
 = 0:1 -1.65 (?) 11.142 (0.1)
 = 0:5 -3.268 (Par Col) -0.949 (?)
Partial Col 45.622 (Par Col)

























Figure 1: Conﬁdence Intervals of Marginal Costs in Each Year
















Figure 2: Conﬁdence Intervals of Margins in Each Year















Figure 3: Conﬁdence Intervals of Margins in Each Year (Partial Collusion)












Figure 4: Conﬁdence Intervals of Margins in Each Year (Full Collusion)



















Figure 5: Margins when  = 0:1 in Each Year
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